VAŽNO! KONAČNO ISPLIVALI DOKAZI KAKO FAJZER TERORIŠE VLADE MNOGIH ZEMALJA!
Izgleda da ipak sve ovo nije teorija već prava zavera. A to je zavera protiv država, njihove nezavisnosti i naroda koji živi u njima i plaćaju ovu ujdurmu, čime se novac naroda, poreskih obveznika sliva u jednu kasu, a to je kasa kompanije Pfizer.
U februaru je Pfizer bio optužen za „maltretiranje“ vlada u pregovorima o vakcini protiv COVID -a u revolucionarnoj priči Biroa za istraživačko novinarstvo. Tadašnji vladin zvaničnik istakao je da: „Pet godina u budućnosti, kada ovi ugovori o poverljivosti budu okončani, saznaćete šta se zaista dogodilo u njima.“
Public Citizen je identifikovao nekoliko neregularnih Pfizer ugovora koji opisuju njihov ishod. Ugovori nude redak uvid u moć koju je jedna farmaceutska korporacija stekla kako bi ućutkala vlade, smanjila snabdevanje, promenila rizik i povećala profit u najtežoj krizi javnog zdravlja u poslednjem veku. U nastavku opisujemo šest primera iz celog sveta.
1. Pfizer zadržava pravo na ćutanje vlada
U januaru se brazilska vlada žalila da je Pfizer insistirao na ugovornim odredbama u pregovorima koji su „nepravedni i zloupotrebljivi“. Vlada je istakla pet uslova za koje je smatrala da su problematični, u rasponu, od odricanja od državnog imuniteta na javnoj imovini do nedostatka kazni za Pfizer ukoliko isporuke kasne. Biro za istraživačko novinarstvo uskoro je objavio oštru priču o Pfizerovim pregovorima o vakcini.
Manje od dva meseca kasnije, brazilska vlada prihvatila je ugovor s Pfizerom koji sadrži većinu istih uslova koje je vlada nekada smatrala nepravednima. Brazil se odrekao suverenog imuniteta i nije izrekao kazne Pfizer -u zbog kašnjenja isporuke, pristao je rešavati sporove pod tajnom privatnom arbitražom prema zakonima New Yorka čime je zaštitio Pfizer od potencijalne tužbe.
Ugovor takođe sadrži dodatni uslov koji nije uključen u druge latinoameričke sporazume koje je pregledao Public Citizen. Brazilskoj vladi je zabranjeno da daje bilo kakvu javnu objavu o postojanju, predmetu ili odredbama (Sporazuma) ili komentariše svoj odnos sa Pfizerom bez prethodnog pisanog pristanka kompanije. Pfizer je stekao moć da ućutka vladu Brazila.
Brazil nije izlovan primer u ovoj priči. Slična odredba o neotkrivanju podataka sadržana je u ugovoru Pfizer -a sa Evropskom komisijom i vladom SAD -a. U tim slučajevima, međutim, obaveza se odnosi na obe strane.
Na primer, ni Pfizer ni američka vlada ne mogu objaviti „bilo kakvu javnu objavu u vezi sa postojanjem, predmetom ili odredbama ovog Ugovora, transakcijama koje on predviđa ili odnosom između Pfizera i Vlade u skladu s ovim Ugovorom, bez prethodnog pisanog pristanka druge strane.“ Ugovor sadrži neke izuzetke za otkrivanje podataka koje zahteva zakon. Iz javnih evidencija nije jasno da li je Pfizer do sada odlučio zabraniti SAD -u davanje bilo kakvih izjava. EK ne može izdati javno saopštenje ili otkriti cenu po dozi Il dati informacije koje bi bile značajne za Pfizer bez pristanka kompanije Pfizer.
2. Pfizer kontroliše donacije.
Pfizer čvrsto kontroliše nabavku. Brazilska vlada je, na primer, ograničena u prihvatanju donacija Pfizer vakcine iz drugih zemalja ili u kupovini Pfizer vakcina od drugih bez Pfizerove dozvole. Brazilska vlada je takođe ograničena u doniranju, distribuciji, izvozu ili na drugi način transportu vakcine izvan Brazila bez Pfizerove dozvole.
Posledice nepoštovanja mogu biti ozbiljne. Ako bi Brazil prihvatio donirane doze bez Pfizerove dozvole, to bi se smatralo „neizlečivim materijalnim kršenjem“ njihovog sporazuma, omogućavajući Pfizeru da odmah raskine ugovor. Po raskidu, Brazil će morati platiti punu cenu za sve preostale ugovorene doze.
3. Pfizer je sebi osigurao „odricanje od IP -a“.
Izvršni direktor kompanije Pfizer, Albert Bourla, pojavio se kao oštar branilac intelektualnog vlasništva u vreme pandemije. Nazvao je dobrovoljne napore Svetske zdravstvene organizacije da podeli intelektualno vlasništvo radi jačanja proizvodnje vakcina „besmislicom“ i „opasnošću“. Rekao je da je odluka predsednika Bidena da podrži odricanje TRIPS -a o intelektualnoj svojini „tako pogrešna“. „IP, koji je krv privatnog sektora, ono je što je donijelo rešenje za ovu pandemiju i trenutno ne predstavlja prepreku“, tvrdi Bourla.
Međutim, čini se da u nekoliko ugovora Pfizer prepoznaje rizik koji intelektualna svojina predstavlja za razvoj, proizvodnju i prodaju vakcina. Ugovori prebacuju odgovornost za bilo kakvo kršenje intelektualne svojine koje bi Pfizer mogao počiniti državnim kupcima. Kao rezultat toga, prema ugovoru, Pfizer može koristiti bilo čije intelektualno vlasništvo koje mu odgovara – uglavnom bez posledica.
Najmanje četiri zemlje moraju “obeštetiti, braniti i držati bezopasan Pfizer” od i protiv svih i njihovih tužbi, potraživanja, radnji, zahteva, odšteta, troškova i izdataka vezanih za intelektualno vlasništvo vakcina. Na primer, ako je drugi proizvođač vakcina tužio Pfizer zbog kršenja patenata u Kolumbiji, ugovor od kolumbijske vlade podmiruje račun. Na zahtev Pfizera, od Kolumbije se traži da brani kompaniju (tj. Preuzme kontrolu nad sudskim postupcima.) Pfizer takođe izričito kaže da ne daje garanciju da njegov proizvod ne krši IP trećih strana ili da mu trebaju dodatne licence .
Pfizer ne preuzima odgovornost u ovim ugovorima za potencijalno kršenje intelektualnog vlasništva. U određenom smislu, Pfizer je sebi osigurao odricanje od IP -a. Međutim, na međunarodnom nivou, Pfizer se bori protiv sličnih napora da se odrekne IP barijera za sve proizvođače.
4. Privatni arbitri, a ne javni sudovi, tajno rešavaju sporove
Šta se događa ako Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo ne može rešiti ugovorni spor s Pfizerom? Tajno veće od tri privatna arbitra – a ne britanski sud – prema ugovoru je ovlašćeno doneti konačnu odluku. Arbitraža se vodi prema pravilima o arbitraži Međunarodne trgovačke komore (ICC). Obe strane moraju čuvati sve u tajnosti:
Strane se slažu da čuvaju poverljivost postojanja arbitraže, arbitražnog postupka, podnesaka stranaka i odluka koje je doneo arbitražni sud, uključujući i njegove odluke, osim u skladu sa zakonom i u meri u kojoj to već nije javno dostupno.
Nacrt ugovora s Albanijom i sporazumi iz Brazila, Čilea, Kolumbije, Dominikanske Republike i Perua zahtevaju od vlada da idu dalje, a ugovorni sporovi podležu arbitraži ICC -a primjenjujući zakon New Yorka.
Iako arbitraža ICC-a u kojoj su uključene države nije neuobičajena, čini se da su sporovi koji uključuju zemlje s visokim prihodima i/ili farmaceutske proizvode relativno retki. 2012. godine 80% državnih sporova bilo je iz podsaharske Afrike, centralne i zapadne Azije te srednje i istočne Evrope. Najčešći državni slučajevi odnosili su se na izgradnju i rad objekata. U 2020. 34 države su bile uključene u arbitraže ICC -a. Priroda državnih sporova nije jasna, ali samo između 5 do 7% svih novih slučajeva ICC -a, uključujući i one samo između privatnih strana, odnosilo se na zdravstvo i farmaceutske proizvode.
Privatna arbitraža odražava neravnotežu moći. Omogućava farmaceutskim korporacijama poput Pfizera da zaobiđu domaće pravne procese. Time se učvršćuje korporativna moć i podriva vladavina prava.
5. Pfizer može imati potraživanja prema državnoj imovini
Gore donesene odluke tajnih arbitražnih veća mogu se izvršiti pred domaćim sudovima. Doktrina suverenog imuniteta ponekad može, međutim, zaštititi države od korporacija koje pokušavaju provesti i izvršiti arbitražne odluke.
Pfizer je zahtevao od Brazila, Čilea, Kolumbije, Dominikanske Republike i Perua da se odreknu suverenog imuniteta. U slučaju Brazila, Čilea i Kolumbije, na primer, vlada se „izričito i neopozivo odriče svakog prava na imunitet koje ona ili njena imovina mogu imati ili steći u budućnosti“ radi sprovođenja bilo koje arbitražne presude (naglasak dodat). Za Brazil, Čile, Kolumbiju i Dominikansku Republiku to uključuje „imunitet protiv zaplene iz predostrožnosti bilo koje njegove imovine.“
Izvršenje arbitražnih odluka predstavlja složena pravna pitanja koja zavise od fizičke lokacije i vrste državne imovine. Ali ugovor dozvoljava Pfizer -u da zahteva da sudovi koriste državnu imovinu kao garanciju da će Pfizer -u biti isplaćena arbitražna odluka i/ili koristiti imovinu za kompenzaciju Pfizera ako vlada ne plati. Na primjer, na američkim sudovima ova imovina može uključivati račune stranih banaka, strana ulaganja i stranu komercijalnu imovinu, uključujući imovinu državnih preduzeća poput aviokompanija i naftnih kompanija.
6. Pfizer odlučuje o ključnim odlukama.
Šta se događa ako dođe do nestašice zaliha vakcine? U albanskom nacrtu ugovora i sporazumu između Brazila i Kolumbije, Pfizer će odlučiti o prilagođavanju rasporeda isporuke na osnovu principa o kojima će odlučivati korporacija. Albanija, Brazil i Kolumbija „smatraće se da pristaju na bilo kakvu reviziju.“
Neke vlade povukle su jednostrano ovlašćenje Pfizera za druge odluke. U Južnoafričkoj Republici Pfizer je želeo imati „isključivu diskreciju za utvrđivanje dodatnih uslova i garancija za ispunjenje obaveza po osnovu odštete“. Južna Afrika je ovo smatrala „previše rizičnim“ i „potencijalnim rizikom za (njihovu) imovinu.“ Nakon kašnjenja, Pfizer je navodno pristao ukloniti ovaj „problematični termin.“
Ali drugi nisu bili tako uspešni. Kao uslov za sklapanje sporazuma, kolumbijska vlada je dužna „pokazati, na način koji je zadovoljavajući za dobavljače, da će dobavljači i njihove firme imati odgovarajuću zaštitu, kako je određeno prema vlastitom nahođenju dobavljača “ (naglasak dodat) iz tužbi za odgovornost . Kolumbija je dužna potvrditi Pfizeru vrednost potencijalnih obaveza (tj. Potencijalnu buduću obavezu) i početi odvajati sredstva za pokrivanje potencijalnih obaveza, prema programu doprinosa.
Iz svega navedenog nedvosmisleno se može doneti zaključak da je Pfizer osposobljen za potpunu kontrolu ključnih odluka čime jasno ukazuje na neravnotežu moći u pregovorima o vakcini. Prema velikoj većini ugovora, interesi Pfizera su na prvom mestu.
Pfizerova dominacija nad suverenim zemljama postavlja temeljne izazove u odgovoru na pandemiju. Vlade se mogu povući. Imajući u vidu da druge vlade osim Američke nemaju mehanizme, a ni poluge moći kako bi uticale na Pfizer, više je nego jasno da su primorane da izvršavaju nametnute zadatke. Korisnicima ovih usluga mnogo sreće u budućnosti, a za sve žalbe, nesuglasice, eventualne probleme nadležna je arbitražni sud iz New York-a, a za eventualne propale pokušaje tužbe, države odgovaraju celokupnom svojom imovinom.
Sarah Teng, intern in the Access to Medicines Program, designed the cover image.
REFERENCE:
[1] Madlen Davies, Rosa Furneaux , Iván Ruiz, Jill Langlois, ‘Held to Ransom’: Pfizer Demands Governments Gamble with State Assets to Secure Vaccine Deal, Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Feb 23 2021), https://tinyurl.com/t2z39a63.
[2] Id.
[3] While there are similarities across the contracts, each agreement is unique. The specific examples outlined below should not read as reflective of other contracts.
[4] In several cases, governments signed additional deals with Pfizer. We reviewed select contracts that were publicly available.
[5] Albania-Pfizer Contract Draft, (“Albania Draft Contract”), (Jan. 6 2021) https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20616251-albanian-pfizer-covid-19-vaccine-contract. The final provisions of the agreement may have differed from this draft. However, given similarities between this draft and the other reviewed agreements, we believe the modifications, if any, were likely not substantial. The contract was first leaked on Twitter, and then shared widely in the press.
[6] Brazil-Pfizer Contract (“Brazil Contract”), (March 15 2021) https://aurores.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Brazil-Pfizer.pdf. The contract was leaked online and later covered by The Guardian in August. See e.g., https://tinyurl.com/yupsz2j4.
[7] Colombia-Pfizer Contract (“Colombia Contract”), (Feb. 2 2021), https://www.nodal.am/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/DOCUMENTO.pdf. The contract was leaked in the Colombian Media in August. https://tinyurl.com/4vswvrz4. It is currently referenced in the UNICEF Vaccine Market Dashboard.
[8] Chile-Pfizer Contract (“Chile Contract”) (Dec. 1 2021), https://www.chiletransparente.cl/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Acuerdo-de-fabricacion-y-suministro-PFIZER.pdf. A Chilean transparency initiative published a redacted version of the contract.
[9] Dominican Republic-Pfizer Contract (“D.R. Contract”) (Oct. 29 2020), https://www.keionline.org/35485. Knowledge Ecology International obtained the contract through a freedom of information law request.
[10] The text was subject to the approval of the Dominican Republican National Congress, which reportedly approved the text with no objections. Pfizer and AstraZeneca, The Game of Contracts with Small Print, Dominican Today, https://tinyurl.com/yhasn7um.
[11] European Commission-Pfizer Contract (“E.C. Contract”) (Nov. 20 2020), https://tinyurl.com/3bph89wy. The Italian public broadcaster RAI published the EC Contract in April.
[12] 15.5 EUR.
[13] Peru-Pfizer Contract (“Peru Contract”) (Sept. 17 2020), https://tinyurl.com/y2ap74xz. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism published the contract.
[14] United States-Pfizer Contract (“U.S. Contract”) (July 21 2020), https://tinyurl.com/4k5j7d5u. The contract is available on the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services website.
[15] United Kingdom-Pfizer Contract (“U.K Contract”) (Oct. 10 2020), https://tinyurl.com/45vt6vd5. This likely is the definitive agreement that follows on from initial agreement announced in July. The contract is available on the U.K government website.
[16] Madlen Davies, Rosa Furneaux, Pfizer backs down over “unreasonable terms” in South Africa vaccine deal (April 19 2021). https://tinyurl.com/tnys9u2c. (“He described how Pfizer’s late demand caused delays in the discussions, which in turn put back the anticipated vaccine delivery dates.”). See also the impasse in Philippines. Philippines receives side letter from Pfizer; WHO sees resolution of ‘impasse’ soon (Feb 23. 2021), https://tinyurl.com/3fs8z3cb (“The delivery of 117,000 Pfizer-BioNTech doses, initially expected in mid-February, was delayed by concerns on indemnification.”).
[17] White House, FACT SHEET: President Biden Announces Historic Vaccine Donation: Half a Billion Pfizer Vaccines to the World’s Lowest-Income Nations (June 10 2021), https://tinyurl.com/he8bm9tk
[18] Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (2007) (tracing the role of Pfizer in advocating for a system of international patent protection).
[19] Zain Rizvi, Jishian Ravinthiran, Amy Kapczynski, Sharing The Knowledge: How President Joe Biden Can Use The Defense Production Act To End The Pandemic Worldwide, Health Affairs Blog (August 6, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210804.101816/full/
[20] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
[21] Madlen Davies , Rosa Furneaux , Iván Ruiz , Jill Langlois, ‘Held to Ransom’: Pfizer Demands Governments Gamble with State Assets to Secure Vaccine Deal, Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Feb 23 2021), https://tinyurl.com/t2z39a63.
[22] Id.
[23] One clause that appears to have changed is the number of doses supplied by Pfizer. It is also not clear whether Brazil developed a foreign bank guarantee fund.
[24] Brazil Contract, footnote 6, Article 9.4 (Waiver of Sovereign Immunity), pg. 45, Article 2.6 (Delivery Delays), pg. 34, Article 9.4 (Waiver of Sovereign Immunity) pg. 45, Article 3.1 (Indemnification by Purchaser), pg. 43, respectively.
[25] The other Latin American contracts reviewed contain a more limited nondisclosure obligation. For example, under the Colombia contract, neither Pfizer nor Colombia can “use the name, trade name, service marks, trademarks, trade dress or logos of the other Party in publicity releases, advertising or any other publication, without the other Party’s prior written consent in each instance.” This does not appear to prohibit the government from talking about the contract, as long as it is not a “publicity release, advertising, or any other publication.”
[26] Brazil Contract, Article 12.3 (Publicity), pg. 32 (“Purchaser shall not make, or permit any person to make, any public announcement concerning the existence, subject matter or terms of this Agreement, the wider transactions contemplated by it, or the relationship between the Parties (except as required by Law, and subject to the protections set forth in Section 10.1), without the prior written consent of Pfizer (such consent not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed)”.
[27] E.C. Contract, footnote 11, Article II.10 (Announcements and Publicity), pg. 36.
[28] U.S. Contract, footnote 14, Article 11.11 (Announcements), pg. 25.
[29] E.C. Contract, footnote 11, Article II.10 (Announcements and Publicity), pg. 36.
[30] For example, Colombia is also required to distribute the vaccine only in its territory. Colombia Contract, footnote 7, Article 4.6 (Diversion Issues), pg. 23 (“All Product delivered to Purchaser shall be: (a) stored securely by Purchaser; and (b) distributed by Purchaser only in Colombia in a secure manner appropriate to the transportation route and destination, in each case (a) and (b) to guard against and deter theft, diversion, tampering, substitution (with, for example, counterfeits) resale or export out of Colombia, and to protect and preserve the integrity and efficacy of the Product.”).
[31] Brazil Contract, footnote 6, Article 2.1 (f) (Agreement to Supply), pg. 31 (“Purchaser, including any related Person or any agents of Purchaser, covenants to exclusively obtain all of its supply of any Vaccine of Pfizer, BioNTech or their respective Affiliates intended for the prevention of the human disease COVID-19 (including the Product) either (i) directly from Pfizer or from Pfizer through the COVAX Facility, or (ii) from a Third Party, whether by donation, resale or otherwise, only if Purchaser has obtained Pfizer’s prior written consent. Any breach of this Section 2.1(f) shall be deemed an uncurable material breach of this Agreement, and Pfizer may immediately terminate this Agreement pursuant to Section 6.2. For clarity, nothing in this Section 2.1(f) shall prevent Purchaser from purchasing competing vaccine products of any Third Party.”).
[32] Brazil Contract, footnote 6, Article 4.6 (Diversion Issues), pg. 38 (“Purchaser shall not directly or indirectly resell, donate, distribute, export or otherwise transport the Product outside the Territory without Pfizer’s prior written consent.”).
[33] Brazil Contract, footnote 6, Article 2.1 (f) (Agreement to Supply), pg. 31.
[34] Brazil Contract, footnote 6, Article 6.2 (Termination for Cause), pg. 27 (“In the event that this Agreement is terminated by Pfizer under this Section 6.2, Purchaser shall pay within thirty (30) days of the date of notice of termination of this Agreement the full Price for all Contracted Doses less amounts already paid to Pfizer as of such date.”)
[35] Ed Silverman, Pharma leaders shoot down WHO voluntary pool for patent rights on Covid-19 products, STAT (May 28 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/28/who-voluntary-pool-patents-pfizer/
[36] U.S. Backs Waiver of Intellectual Property Protection for Covid-19 Vaccines, Wall Street Journal (May 6 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-backs-waiver-of-intellectual-property-protection-for-covid-19-vaccines-11620243518
[37] WTO delays decision on waiver on COVID-19 drug, vaccine rights (Dec. 10 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-wto-idUSKBN28K2WL
[38] This extends to all civil claims, including adverse effects. That has been detailed elsewhere: Madlen Davies, Rosa Furneaux , Iván Ruiz , Jill Langlois, ‘Held to Ransom’: Pfizer Demands Governments Gamble with State Assets to Secure Vaccine Deal, Bureau of Investigative Journalism (Feb 23 2021), https://tinyurl.com/t2z39a63.
[39] Colombia Contract, footnote 7, Article 8.2 (Assumption of Defense), pg. 31.
[40] Pfizer signed the letter opposing the TRIPS waiver sent to President Biden in March, for example. PhRMA Letter Opposing TRIPS Waiver to President Biden (March 5 2021), https://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/2021-03-05-phrma-letter.pdf
[41] U.K. Contract, footnote 15, Article 23 (Dispute Resolution) pg. 36. (“The arbitration award shall be final and binding on the Parties, and the parties undertake to carry out any award without delay. Judgment upon the award may be entered by any court having jurisdiction of the award or having jurisdiction over the relevant party or its assets.”)
[42] Id.
[43] Article on Governing Law. Albania Draft Contract pg. 34, Brazil Contract pg. 45, Chile Contract pg. 29, Colombia Contract pg. 43, DR Contract pg. 17, Peru Contract pg. 9.
[44] Our analysis is limited by a lack of transparency.
[45] Arbitration Involving States and State Entities under the ICC Rules of Arbitration – Report of the ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR (2012), https://iccwbo.org/publication/arbitration-involving-states-state-entities-icc-rules-arbitration-report-icc-commission-arbitration-adr/, pg. 4.
[46] Arbitration Involving States and State Entities under the ICC Rules of Arbitration – Report of the ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR (2012), https://iccwbo.org/publication/arbitration-involving-states-state-entities-icc-rules-arbitration-report-icc-commission-arbitration-adr/, pg. 4.
[47] 194 state-owned entities were also involved. ICC Dispute Resolution 2020 Statistics, https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-dispute-resolution-statistics-2020/ pg. 11. See also, an analogous mechanism known as investor-state dispute resolution, which is based on international law as opposed to contract: Global Trade Watch, Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims Under NAFTA and Other U.S. “Trade Deals” (Jan. 15 2021), https://www.citizen.org/article/table-of-foreign-investor-state-cases-and-claims-under-nafta-and-other-u-s-trade-deals/
[48] ICC Dispute Resolution 2020 Statistics, https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-dispute-resolution-statistics-2020/ pg. 17.
[49] United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June 1958) (“Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles.”)
[50] Article on Waiver of Sovereign Immunity. The language differs in some of the contracts. Brazil Contract, pg. 45, Chile Contract pg. 24, Colombia Contract pg. 36, DR Contract pg. 17, Peru Contract pg. 9.
[51] Id.
[52] Id.
[53] In the U.S., the governing statute is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 28 U.S.C § 1602. Sovereign property used for commercial activity can be used to execute a judgment based on an arbitral award if the state has waived immunity. Property belonging to an instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity can also be used. 28 U.S.C § 1610. However, certain kinds of foreign sovereign property are absolutely immune from award attachment and execution. This includes property belonging to the foreign central bank or monetary authority and property used for military purposes. 28 U.S.C §1611.
[54] Under FSIA, this is known as “attachment prior to the entry of judgment” and can be done if the state waives this kind of immunity and “the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C § 1610
[55] Other jurisdictions may handle these questions differently, potentially exposing other types of sovereign assets. These assets may also be vulnerable in settlement negotiations.
[56] Albania Draft Contract, pg. 14. Brazil Contract, pg. 22. Colombia Contract, pg. 15.
[57] Pfizer Backs Down Over Unreasonable Terms in South Africa Vaccine Deal (April 19 2021), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2021-04-19/pfizer-backs-down-over-asset-seizing-clause-in-south-africa-vaccine-deal.
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] Colombia Contract, footnote 7, Article 8.5 (Privileges and Immunities), pg. 32. This includes but is not limited to funding state contractual contingency funds.
[61] Id.
